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On this page
  • Introduction: The Need for Effective Customer Phishing Detection Capabilities
  • Table of Contents
  • 1. Initial Detection of Phishing Campaign
  • 2. Compromised Customer Account Indicators
  • 3. Threat Delivery and Payload Analysis
  • 4. Threat Persistence
  • 5. Incident Response and Containment
  • 6. Conclusion
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  1. Detection Engineering
  2. Attack Triage Playbooks (KQL Triage)

Customer Phishing Detection Playbook

Introduction: The Need for Effective Customer Phishing Detection Capabilities

Customer phishing attacks pose a significant threat to businesses, targeting customers with fraudulent emails, fake websites, and impersonation schemes designed to steal credentials, financial information, or sensitive personal data. Cybercriminals exploit trust in well-known brands by creating convincing phishing campaigns that mimic legitimate communications, leading to account takeovers, financial fraud, and reputational damage for organisations. As phishing tactics grow more sophisticated—leveraging AI-generated emails, brand spoofing, and advanced social engineering techniques—businesses must implement proactive detection capabilities to protect their customers and brand integrity.

Effective customer phishing detection capabilities and processes are essential for identifying and mitigating phishing campaigns before they cause widespread harm. A robust detection strategy should include brand monitoring, domain spoofing detection, real-time threat intelligence, and machine learning-based anomaly detection to identify fraudulent emails, websites, and social media scams. Security solutions such as DMARC (Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting & Conformance), AI-driven email filtering, and Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) platforms help enhance visibility into phishing threats targeting customers.

To combat customer phishing effectively, organisations must implement continuous monitoring, automated alerting, and rapid response mechanisms, including takedown services for fraudulent domains. Additionally, proactive customer education and awareness initiatives can help mitigate the risks of phishing scams. By strengthening detection capabilities and response processes, businesses can protect their customers, reduce fraud-related losses, and maintain trust in their brand.

Table of Contents

  1. Initial Detection of Phishing Campaign

    • Identify Suspicious Emails Targeting Customers

    • Detect Malicious URL Activity

    • Analyse Unusual Traffic from Customer Accounts

  2. Compromised Customer Account Indicators

    • Failed Login Attempts

    • Unusual Login Patterns

    • Email Forwarding or Auto-Reply Rules

  3. Threat Delivery and Payload Analysis

    • Malicious Attachments

    • URL Redirect Chains

    • Advanced Payload Execution Monitoring

  4. Threat Persistence

    • Monitoring for Persistent Phishing Rules

    • OAuth Application Exploitation

    • Indicators of Repeated Credential Abuse

  5. Incident Response and Containment

    • Isolate Affected Accounts and Devices

    • Correlate Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

    • Timeline Reconstruction

  6. Conclusion


This playbook provides a structured approach to detecting and investigating customer phishing compromises within an organisation using KQL queries with Microsoft Defender and Sentinel. Each section contains multiple query options, detailed descriptions, and expected results.

1. Initial Detection of Phishing Campaign

Query Option 1: Identify Suspicious Emails Targeting Customers

EmailEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where Subject matches regex @"(verify|update|account|payment|login)"
| where RecipientDomain contains "<customer_domain>"
| project Timestamp, SenderEmailAddress, RecipientEmailAddress, Subject, SenderIP

Description: Detects phishing emails targeting customers by analysing suspicious subjects and sender details. Results include email headers and sender IPs.

Query Option 2: Detect Malicious URL Activity

UrlClickEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where Url contains_any ("bit.ly", "tinyurl.com", "redirect", "phish")
| summarize ClickCount = count() by RecipientEmailAddress, Url
| where ClickCount > 3
| project RecipientEmailAddress, Url, ClickCount

Description: Tracks customers clicking on malicious URLs multiple times. Results include recipient email addresses and associated URLs.

Query Option 3: Analyse Unusual Traffic from Customer Accounts

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public" and Protocol == "HTTP"
| summarize TotalRequests = count() by DeviceName, RemoteIPAddress
| where TotalRequests > 50
| project DeviceName, RemoteIPAddress, TotalRequests

Description: Identifies devices with high volumes of outbound traffic to public IPs, potentially communicating with phishing infrastructure. Results display affected devices and IPs.


2. Compromised Customer Account Indicators

Query Option 1: Failed Login Attempts

SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where ResultType == "Failure"
| summarize FailureCount = count() by UserPrincipalName, IPAddress
| where FailureCount > 5
| project UserPrincipalName, IPAddress, FailureCount

Description: Detects customers with repeated failed login attempts, possibly due to credential stuffing or phishing. Results show usernames and IP addresses.

Query Option 2: Unusual Login Patterns

SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where Location != "<expected_location>"
| summarize LoginCount = count() by UserPrincipalName, Location, IPAddress
| where LoginCount > 1
| project UserPrincipalName, Location, IPAddress, LoginCount

Description: Flags logins from unexpected geolocations. Results include account names, locations, and associated IPs.

Query Option 3: Email Forwarding or Auto-Reply Rules

EmailRulesEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType == "Create" and RuleConditions contains "forward" and RecipientDomain != "<customer_domain>"
| project Timestamp, UserId, RuleName, RuleConditions

Description: Detects the creation of email rules that forward emails externally, a common indicator of compromised accounts. Results display affected accounts and rule details.


3. Threat Delivery and Payload Analysis

Query Option 1: Malicious Attachments

EmailAttachmentInfo
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileType in ("exe", "vbs", "js", "bat", "hta")
| summarize AttachmentCount = count() by FileName, SenderEmailAddress
| where AttachmentCount > 1
| project FileName, SenderEmailAddress, AttachmentCount

Description: Flags suspicious attachments often used in phishing campaigns. Results show filenames and associated senders.

Query Option 2: URL Redirect Chains

UrlClickEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where Url contains "redirect" or Url contains "login"
| summarize RedirectChain = make_list(Url) by RecipientEmailAddress
| project RecipientEmailAddress, RedirectChain

Description: Maps URL redirect chains to identify phishing paths. Results include recipient emails and redirect URLs.

Query Option 3: Advanced Payload Execution Monitoring

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ParentFileName in ("outlook.exe", "winword.exe") and (CommandLine contains_any ("powershell", "cmd"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, CommandLine, ParentFileName

Description: Identifies processes spawned by email clients or documents, indicating possible phishing payload execution. Results display command details and parent processes.


4. Threat Persistence

Query Option 1: Monitoring for Persistent Phishing Rules

EmailRulesEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where RuleName contains "forward" or RuleName contains "auto-reply"
| project Timestamp, UserId, RuleName, RecipientDomain

Description: Detects persistent email rules created in customer accounts. Results include rule details and affected users.

Query Option 2: OAuth Application Exploitation

OAuthEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ApprovalStatus == "Granted" and AppName != "TrustedApp"
| project Timestamp, UserPrincipalName, AppName, AppId, ApprovalStatus

Description: Identifies unauthorized OAuth application approvals. Results include application names and associated accounts.

Query Option 3: Indicators of Repeated Credential Abuse

SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where AuthenticationMethod == "Token" and UserPrincipalName in ("<sensitive_customer_accounts>")
| project Timestamp, UserPrincipalName, AuthenticationMethod, IPAddress

Description: Flags repeated token-based authentication attempts for sensitive customer accounts. Results include usernames and IPs.


5. Incident Response and Containment

Query Option 1: Isolate Affected Accounts and Devices

SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where UserPrincipalName in ("<compromised_customer_accounts>")
| project Timestamp, UserPrincipalName, IPAddress, Location

Description: Tracks activity from known compromised accounts. Results assist in isolating accounts.

Query Option 2: Correlate Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

union DeviceProcessEvents, EmailEvents, DeviceNetworkEvents
| where SHA256 in ("<IoC_hashes>")
| project Timestamp, EventType = $table, DeviceName, FileName, SHA256

Description: Correlates IoCs with processes, email, and network activities. Results highlight impacted devices and files.

Query Option 3: Timeline Reconstruction

union EmailEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| project Timestamp, EventType = $table, DeviceName, SenderEmailAddress, CommandLine, RemoteIPAddress
| order by Timestamp asc

Description: Creates a timeline of phishing-related activities to provide a comprehensive view of the incident. Results show sequence and context.


6. Conclusion

The playbook offers a good approach to detecting and analysing compromises in an environment. However, its usefulness depends on the environment and tools at your disposal. For an environment where KQL is an option, the queries may require some adaptation to specific data sources and infrastructure setup.

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Last updated 4 months ago