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On this page
  • Introduction: The Need for Effective Malicious Network Behavior Detection Capabilities
  • Table of Contents
  • 1. Initial Detection of Malicious Network Behaviour
  • 2. Command and Control (C2) Indicators
  • 3. Data Exfiltration Indicators
  • 4. Threat Persistence Indicators
  • 5. Incident Response and Containment
  • 6. Conclusion
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  1. Detection Engineering
  2. Attack Triage Playbooks (KQL Triage)

Malicious Network Behaviour Detection Playbook

Introduction: The Need for Effective Malicious Network Behavior Detection Capabilities

As cyber threats continue to evolve, malicious network behaviour remains one of the most critical indicators of potential security breaches. Threat actors, whether external attackers or malicious insiders, often exploit network infrastructure to conduct reconnaissance, establish persistence, exfiltrate data, or deploy malware. Advanced tactics such as command-and-control (C2) communications, lateral movement, DNS tunneling, and encrypted traffic abuse make it increasingly difficult to detect malicious activities using traditional security measures. Given the complexity of modern enterprise networks—including cloud, hybrid, and on-premises environments—organisations require proactive and scalable detection capabilities.

Effective malicious network behaviour detection capabilities and processes are essential to identifying and mitigating security threats before they escalate. A comprehensive detection strategy should incorporate real-time network traffic analysis, anomaly detection, intrusion detection systems (IDS), and threat intelligence integration. Security tools such as Network Detection and Response (NDR), Security Information and Event Management (SIEM), and Extended Detection and Response (XDR) enhance visibility into suspicious activities by correlating data across endpoints, networks, and identities.

To stay ahead of emerging threats, organisations must implement continuous monitoring, automated alerting, and forensic investigation capabilities for network traffic. Leveraging machine learning-driven anomaly detection, behavioural analytics, and proactive threat-hunting techniques further strengthens an organisation's ability to detect and respond to malicious network behaviour. By enhancing visibility and response processes, businesses can protect their critical assets, prevent data breaches, and maintain a resilient cybersecurity posture.

Table of Contents

  1. Initial Detection of Malicious Network Behaviour

    • Identify Abnormal Network Traffic Patterns

    • Detect Communication with Known Malicious IPs

    • Monitor Suspicious DNS Queries

  2. Command and Control (C2) Indicators

    • Detect Long-Lived Connections

    • Identify Beaconing Activity

    • Monitor HTTP/HTTPS Traffic for Suspicious Patterns

  3. Data Exfiltration Indicators

    • Large Outbound Data Transfers

    • Detect Anomalous Cloud Storage Access

    • Monitor Unusual Protocol Usage

  4. Threat Persistence Indicators

    • Monitor Backdoor Communication

    • Detect Persistent Network Tunnels

    • Identify Abnormal Service Connections

  5. Incident Response and Containment

    • Isolate Compromised Systems

    • Correlate Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

    • Timeline Reconstruction

  6. Conclusion


This playbook provides KQL queries and techniques to detect, analyse, and respond to malicious network behaviour using Microsoft Defender and Sentinel. Each section offers multiple query options with detailed descriptions and expected results.

1. Initial Detection of Malicious Network Behaviour

Query Option 1: Identify Abnormal Network Traffic Patterns

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public" and BytesSent > 5000000
| summarize TotalBytesSent = sum(BytesSent) by DeviceName, RemoteIPAddress
| where TotalBytesSent > 10000000
| project DeviceName, RemoteIPAddress, TotalBytesSent

Description: Detects devices sending large volumes of data to public IPs. Results highlight potential data exfiltration.

Query Option 2: Detect Communication with Known Malicious IPs

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where RemoteIPAddress in ("<malicious_ip_list>")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIPAddress, Protocol

Description: Identifies communication with known malicious IP addresses. Results display devices and protocols involved.

Query Option 3: Monitor Suspicious DNS Queries

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where Protocol == "DNS" and strlen(RemoteDnsDomain) > 50
| summarize QueryCount = count() by RemoteDnsDomain
| where QueryCount > 100
| project RemoteDnsDomain, QueryCount

Description: Flags DNS queries with unusually long domain names, often used in DNS tunneling. Results display domains and query counts.


2. Command and Control (C2) Indicators

Query Option 1: Detect Long-Lived Connections

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ConnectionDuration > 3600
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIPAddress, ConnectionDuration

Description: Identifies network connections lasting longer than one hour, potentially indicating a C2 session. Results include devices and IP addresses.

Query Option 2: Identify Beaconing Activity

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| summarize Interval = min(Timestamp) by DeviceName, RemoteIPAddress
| where Interval < 10s
| project DeviceName, RemoteIPAddress, Interval

Description: Detects repeated communication with a consistent interval, characteristic of beaconing activity. Results include devices and IPs.

Query Option 3: Monitor HTTP/HTTPS Traffic for Suspicious Patterns

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where Protocol in ("HTTP", "HTTPS") and Url contains_any ("/login", "/auth")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIPAddress, Url

Description: Tracks suspicious HTTP/HTTPS traffic patterns, often used in C2 communications. Results display URLs and associated devices.


3. Data Exfiltration Indicators

Query Option 1: Large Outbound Data Transfers

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where BytesSent > 10000000
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIPAddress, BytesSent

Description: Flags significant outbound data transfers. Results highlight devices and destination IPs.

Query Option 2: Detect Anomalous Cloud Storage Access

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteDnsDomain endswith_any ("amazonaws.com", "googleapis.com", "blob.core.windows.net")
| summarize TotalDataTransferred = sum(BytesSent) by DeviceName, RemoteDnsDomain
| where TotalDataTransferred > 5000000
| project DeviceName, RemoteDnsDomain, TotalDataTransferred

Description: Tracks data uploads to cloud storage services. Results include devices, domains, and upload volumes.

Query Option 3: Monitor Unusual Protocol Usage

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where Protocol not in ("HTTP", "HTTPS", "DNS", "SMB")
| summarize ProtocolCount = count() by Protocol, DeviceName
| project DeviceName, Protocol, ProtocolCount

Description: Flags uncommon protocols used for data transfers. Results highlight protocols and associated devices.


4. Threat Persistence Indicators

Query Option 1: Monitor Backdoor Communication

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where RemoteIPAddress in ("<backdoor_ip_list>")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIPAddress, Protocol

Description: Detects communication with backdoor IPs. Results display devices, IPs, and protocols involved.

Query Option 2: Detect Persistent Network Tunnels

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ConnectionDuration > 1800 and RemoteIPType == "Public"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIPAddress, ConnectionDuration

Description: Identifies long-lived network tunnels, often used for persistent connections. Results highlight devices and remote IPs.

Query Option 3: Identify Abnormal Service Connections

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where RemotePort in ("22", "3389") and Direction == "Inbound"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIPAddress, RemotePort

Description: Flags unusual connections to critical services like SSH and RDP. Results display devices, remote IPs, and ports.


5. Incident Response and Containment

Query Option 1: Isolate Compromised Systems

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteIPAddress in ("<compromised_ip_list>")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIPAddress

Description: Tracks communication with compromised IPs, assisting in system isolation. Results display affected devices.

Query Option 2: Correlate Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

union DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceNetworkEvents
| where SHA256 in ("<IoC_hashes>")
| project Timestamp, EventType = $table, DeviceName, FileName, SHA256

Description: Correlates IoCs with device and network activities. Results highlight compromised systems and artifacts.

Query Option 3: Timeline Reconstruction

union DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| project Timestamp, EventType = $table, DeviceName, RemoteIPAddress, ProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp asc

Description: Creates a timeline of malicious network activities to support incident response. Results display event sequences and associated data.


6. Conclusion

The playbook offers a good approach to detecting and analysing compromises in an environment. However, its usefulness depends on the environment and tools at your disposal. For an environment where KQL is an option, the queries may require some adaptation to specific data sources and infrastructure setup.

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Last updated 4 months ago