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On this page
  • Introduction: The Need for Effective Ransomware Detection Capabilities
  • Table of Contents
  • 1. Initial Detection of Ransomware Activity
  • 2. Persistence Mechanisms
  • 3. Privilege Escalation Indicators
  • 4. Lateral Movement
  • 5. Data Exfiltration Detection
  • 6. Incident Response and Containment
  • 7. Conclusion
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  1. Detection Engineering
  2. Attack Triage Playbooks (KQL Triage)

Ransomware Detection Playbook

Introduction: The Need for Effective Ransomware Detection Capabilities

Ransomware remains one of the most disruptive and financially damaging cyber threats facing organisations today. Modern ransomware attacks have evolved beyond simple file encryption, incorporating double and triple extortion tactics, data exfiltration, and persistent lateral movement to maximise impact. Adversaries exploit vulnerabilities, compromised credentials, and social engineering tactics to gain initial access, then deploy stealthy techniques to evade detection before executing their attack. Given the increasing sophistication of ransomware groups and the expanding attack surface across cloud, hybrid, and on-premises environments, organisations must adopt a proactive and multi-layered detection approach.

Effective ransomware detection capabilities and processes are critical to identifying and mitigating attacks before they escalate into full-scale incidents. A robust detection strategy should integrate real-time endpoint and network monitoring, behavioural analytics, anomaly detection, and threat intelligence. Security tools such as Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR), Extended Detection and Response (XDR), and Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) solutions play a crucial role in detecting ransomware indicators, including unauthorised file encryption, unusual privilege escalation, and rapid file modifications.

To stay ahead of ransomware threats, organisations must implement continuous threat-hunting, automated alerting, and incident response playbooks designed for rapid containment and recovery. By enhancing visibility, leveraging advanced analytics, and strengthening security controls, organisations can improve their ability to detect and prevent ransomware attacks, minimising financial and operational damage while ensuring business continuity.

Table of Contents

  1. Initial Detection of Ransomware Activity

    • Identify Suspicious File Modifications

    • Detect Unusual Encryption Activities

    • Advanced Network Traffic Analysis

  2. Persistence Mechanisms

    • Registry Persistence Indicators

    • Scheduled Task Creation

    • Startup Folder Monitoring

  3. Privilege Escalation Indicators

    • Detect Abnormal Account Activity

    • Credential Dumping Attempts

    • Privilege Escalation via Exploits

  4. Lateral Movement

    • SMB-Based Propagation

    • Lateral Movement via Remote Execution

    • Advanced Detection of SSH Movement

  5. Data Exfiltration Detection

    • Large Data Transfers to External IPs

    • Anomalous Cloud Storage Activity

    • DNS or HTTPS Exfiltration

  6. Incident Response and Containment

    • Isolate Affected Systems

    • Identify Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

    • Incident Timeline Reconstruction

  7. Conclusion


This playbook provides advanced KQL queries and techniques to detect, analyse, and respond to ransomware compromises across an enterprise. Each section offers multiple query options with detailed descriptions and expected results.

1. Initial Detection of Ransomware Activity

Query Option 1: Identify Suspicious File Modifications

DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType in ("FileModified", "FileRenamed")
| where FileName endswith ".txt" or FileName endswith ".log"
| where FolderPath contains "Desktop" or FolderPath contains "Documents"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType

Description: Detects suspicious modifications to common file types often targeted by ransomware. Results display modified file details and locations.

Query Option 2: Detect Unusual Encryption Activities

DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName endswith ".encrypted" or FileName matches regex @"\.\w{4,6}" and not (FileName contains ".txt" or FileName contains ".doc")
| summarize EncryptedCount = count() by DeviceName, FolderPath
| where EncryptedCount > 50
| project DeviceName, FolderPath, EncryptedCount

Description: Flags potential ransomware encryption activities by analysing file extensions and volume of encrypted files. Results highlight affected folders and devices.

Query Option 3: Advanced Network Traffic Analysis

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public" and BytesSent > 1000000
| summarize TotalBytesSent = sum(BytesSent) by DeviceName, RemoteIPAddress
| where TotalBytesSent > 10000000
| project DeviceName, RemoteIPAddress, TotalBytesSent

Description: Identifies devices with unusually large outbound traffic, indicating possible ransomware communication or exfiltration. Results include devices, IPs, and data volumes.


2. Persistence Mechanisms

Query Option 1: Registry Persistence Indicators

DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RegistryKeyPath has_any ("Run", "RunOnce", "Policies\\Explorer")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RegistryKeyPath, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData

Description: Detects registry keys often modified by ransomware for persistence. Results display registry paths and modified values.

Query Option 2: Scheduled Task Creation

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "schtasks" and ProcessCommandLine contains "/create"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName

Description: Identifies the creation of scheduled tasks, often used for persistence. Results include initiating accounts and devices.

Query Option 3: Startup Folder Monitoring

DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FolderPath contains "Startup" and FileName endswith ".exe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FolderPath, FileName

Description: Flags executables added to startup folders, a common persistence technique. Results display file details and timestamps.


3. Privilege Escalation Indicators

Query Option 1: Detect Abnormal Account Activity

DeviceLogonEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where LogonStatus != "Success"
| summarize FailedAttempts = count() by AccountName, DeviceName
| where FailedAttempts > 20
| project AccountName, DeviceName, FailedAttempts

Description: Detects accounts with repeated failed login attempts. Results highlight potentially compromised accounts.

Query Option 2: Credential Dumping Attempts

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in ("procdump.exe", "lsass.exe") and ProcessCommandLine contains "-ma"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine

Description: Flags attempts to dump credentials from memory. Results show processes and associated devices.

Query Option 3: Privilege Escalation via Exploits

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(\\bexploit\\b|\\belevate\\b|\\bprivilege\\b)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName

Description: Detects commands used for privilege escalation. Results display timestamps, devices, and associated accounts.


4. Lateral Movement

Query Option 1: SMB-Based Propagation

DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FolderPath startswith "\\\\" and FileName endswith ".exe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FolderPath, FileName

Description: Detects executable files being accessed over SMB shares. Results highlight potential ransomware propagation paths.

Query Option 2: Lateral Movement via Remote Execution

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ProcessCommandLine contains_any ("psexec", "wmic")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName

Description: Tracks remote execution commands used for lateral movement. Results include initiating accounts and devices.

Query Option 3: Advanced Detection of SSH Movement

DeviceLogonEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where LogonType == "Network" and ProcessName == "ssh"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, RemoteIPAddress

Description: Flags SSH-based lateral movement. Results include accounts and associated devices.


5. Data Exfiltration Detection

Query Option 1: Large Data Transfers to External IPs

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where BytesSent > 10000000
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIPAddress, BytesSent

Description: Identifies significant outbound data transfers. Results include source devices and data volumes.

Query Option 2: Anomalous Cloud Storage Activity

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where RemoteDnsDomain endswith "amazonaws.com" or RemoteDnsDomain endswith "blob.core.windows.net"
| summarize TotalData = sum(BytesSent) by RemoteDnsDomain, DeviceName
| where TotalData > 50000000
| project RemoteDnsDomain, DeviceName, TotalData

Description: Tracks large data uploads to cloud storage services. Results display domain names and data volumes.

Query Option 3: DNS or HTTPS Exfiltration

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where Protocol in ("DNS", "HTTPS") and strlen(RemoteDnsDomain) > 50
| summarize QueryCount = count() by RemoteDnsDomain
| where QueryCount > 100
| project RemoteDnsDomain, QueryCount

Description: Detects DNS or HTTPS exfiltration based on query patterns. Results include domain names and query counts.


6. Incident Response and Containment

Query Option 1: Isolate Affected Systems

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteIPAddress in ("<IoC-IP-List>")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIPAddress

Description: Identifies systems communicating with known malicious IPs. Results assist in isolation efforts.

Query Option 2: Identify Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

union DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceFileEvents
| where SHA256 in ("<IoC-Hash-List>")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, SHA256

Description: Correlates IoCs (hashes) with process and file events. Results display impacted devices and files.

Query Option 3: Incident Timeline Reconstruction

union DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceNetworkEvents, DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| project Timestamp, EventType = $table, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, RemoteIPAddress, FileName
| order by Timestamp asc

Description: Creates a timeline of ransomware-related activities. Results provide a comprehensive incident overview.


7. Conclusion

The playbook offers a good approach to detecting and analysing compromises in an environment. However, its usefulness depends on the environment and tools at your disposal. For an environment where KQL is an option, the queries may require some adaptation to specific data sources and infrastructure setup.

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Last updated 4 months ago