🔏
RootGuard
HomeSOC OperationsIncident ResponseWindows ForensicsLinux ForensicsKQL Investigations
  • Welcome
    • RootGuard
      • Who Am I?
        • Professional Profile
  • Resources Hub
    • Blogs
      • Articles
        • Safeguarding SMEs: The Strategic Importance of a Security Operations Center (SOC)
      • Posts
        • Roadmap to Becoming a Cybersecurity Specialist
        • Starting a Career in Cybersecurity
        • A Guide to Landing Your First Cybersecurity Analyst Role
        • Moving from Intermediate to Expert Incident Responder
  • SOC Operations
    • Introduction
      • Development Resources
        • SOC Analysts Roadmap
        • Becoming A SOC Analyst
        • SOC Analysts Prep Interview Questions
    • Essential Skills
      • Critical Windows EventIDs to Monitor
    • Junior Analyst Skills
      • Splunk Use Cases
      • KQL Use Cases
        • Reconnaissance (TA0043)
        • Initial Access (TA0001)
        • Execution (TA0002)
        • Persistence (TA0003)
        • Privilege Escalation (TA0004)
        • Defence Evasion (TA0005)
        • Credential Access (TA0006)
        • Discovery (TA0007)
        • Lateral Movement (TA0008)
        • Collection (TA0009)
        • Command and Control (TA0011)
        • Exfiltration (TA0010)
        • Impact (TA0040)
      • Investigating Common Attacks
        • Domain Dominance Attacks - Detection & Analysis
        • Investigating a Suspected AD FS Distributed Key Management (DKM) Attack
        • Authentication From Suspicious DeviceName
        • Identifying Interactive or RemoteInteractive Session From Service Account
        • Identifying Split or Part Archive File Transfers
        • Detect Potential Cleartext Credentials in Command Line
        • Detecting Command Line Interpreters Launched via Scheduled Tasks
        • Detecting Files Containing Potentially Sensitive Data
        • Detecting DeviceNetworkEvents From Windows Processes and Domains by TLD
        • Detecting Silent cmd.exe Execution With Redirected STDERR & STDOUT
        • Detecting Low Prevalence DLL Loaded From Process In User Downloads Directory
        • Detecting Virtual Drive Mounted From Archive
        • Identify Execution of Script From User's Downloads Folder
        • Identify Potential RDP Tunneled Sessions
        • Identify Instances of PowerShell Invoke-WebRequest, IWR or Net.WebClient
        • Identify Processes Launched by PowerShell Remoting (WSMProvHost.exe)
        • Detect DeviceNetworkEvents for LOLBAS with Download or Upload Functions
        • Detect Execution of PSEXESVC via Remote Systems
        • Identify Suspicious String in Service Creation ImagePath
        • Identify File with Double Extensions
        • Detect Potential Cleartext Credentials in Commandline
        • Detect When Large Number of Files Downloaded From OneDrive or SharePoint
        • Identify and Investigate Phishing Attacks with KQL
      • PowerShell for SecOps
        • Powershell Remoting
        • Reconnaissance Discovery
        • Initial Access Discovery
        • Execution Discovery
        • Persistence Discovery
        • Privilege Escalation Discovery
        • Defence Evasion Discovery
        • Credential Access Discovery
        • Discovery
        • Lateral Movement Discovery
        • Collection Discovery
        • Command & Control (C2) Discovery
        • Exfiltration Discovery
        • Impact Discovery
      • Packet Analysis (pcap)
        • Tcpdump
        • Tcpdump (Intermediate)
        • Tshark
        • Ngrep
      • Investigating Suspicious Emails Using KQL
    • Intermediate and Advanced Skills
      • Investigate Using MITRE ATT&CK Methodology
        • Reconnaissance (TA0043) Techniques
        • Resource Development (TA0042) Techniques
        • Initial Access (TA0001) Techniques
        • Command Execution (TA0002) Techniques
        • Persistence (TA0003) Techniques
        • Privilege Escalation (TA0004) Techniques
        • Defence Evasion (TA0005) Techniques
        • Credential Access (TA0006) Techniques
        • Discovery (TA0007) Techniques
        • Lateral Movement (TA0008) Techniques
        • Collection (TA0009) Techniques
        • Command and Control (C2) (TA0011) Techniques
        • Exfiltration (TA0010) Techniques
        • Impact (TA0040) Techniques
    • Vulnerability Management
    • Malware Analysis
  • DFIR
    • Incident Response
      • Incident Triage
        • Triage Types and Processes
        • PowerShell for Detection and Analysis
          • Malware or Compromise Investigation
          • Lateral Movement Discovery
        • Registry Analysis
        • Sysinternals Intrusion Analysis
        • PowerShell Intrusion Analysis
        • Velociraptor Intrusion Analysis
        • Zimmerman Tools Intrusion Analysis
      • KAPE Artifacts Analysis
      • Velociraptor Artifacts Analysis
      • Using The Unified Kill Chain Model to Analyse Individual Cyber Attacks
        • Phase 1 - Gaining an Initial Foothold
          • Gaining Access to the Network
          • Establishing a Foothold
          • Network Discovery
      • Response Strategies
        • Privilege Escalation Assessment
        • Command and Control Assessment
        • Command Execution Assessment
        • Defence Evasion Assessment
        • Detection Assessment
        • Discovery Assessment
        • Exfiltration Assessment
        • Initial Access Assessment
        • Initial Impact Assessment Techniques
        • Lateral Movement Assessment
        • Persistence Assessment
    • Windows Forensics
      • Evidence of Execution
      • Window Artifact Analysis
        • Account Usage
        • User Activity Tracking (Event Logs)
        • Program Execution
        • File and Folder Opening
        • File Download
        • Browser Usage
        • Deleted File or File Knowledge
        • External Device & USB Usage
    • Linux Forensics
      • Linux Commandline Basics
      • Host Compromise Assessment
    • KQL for Defender & Sentinel
      • MDO (Office)
      • MDI (Identity)
      • MDE (Endpoint)
    • Memory Forensics
      • Memory Forensics (Volatility 3)
    • Playbooks
      • First Responder DFIR Playbook
        • Device Isolation
        • Evidence Collection
          • Acquire Triage Image Using KAPE
          • Acquire Triage Data Using Velociraptor
          • Acquire Triage Data Using Powershell
          • Acquire Triage Memory Image
          • Acquire Image Using FTK
          • AXIOM Cyber Data Collection
        • Windows Forensic Artefacts
          • Application Execution
          • File & Folder Knowledge
          • External Device Usage
          • Network Activity
          • Windows Event Logs
        • Initial Analysis
          • Memory Analysis (Vol 3)
          • Axiom Cyber Examiner
  • Detection Engineering
    • AD Attack Detections & Mitigations
      • Kerberoasting
      • Authentication Server Response (AS-REP) Roasting
      • Password Spraying
      • MachineAccountQuota Compromise
      • Unconstrained Delegation
      • Password in Group Policy Preferences (GPP) Compromise
      • Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) Compromise
      • Golden Certificate
      • DCSync
      • Dumping ntds.dit
      • Golden Ticket
      • Silver Ticket
      • Golden Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
      • Microsoft Entra Connect Compromise
      • One-way Domain Trust Bypass
      • Security Identifier (SID) History Compromise
      • Skeleton Key
      • Active Directory Security Controls
      • Active Directory Events for Detecting Compromise
    • Attack Triage Playbooks (KQL Triage)
      • Windows Malware Detection Playbook
      • Linux Host Intrusion Detection Playbook (CLI)
      • Linux Intrusion Detection Playbook
      • Large-Scale Compromise Detection Playbook
      • Ransomware Detection Playbook
      • Phishing Email Compromise Detection Playbook
      • Scam Detection Playbook
      • Customer Phishing Detection Playbook
      • Insider Abuse Detection Playbook
      • Information Leakage Detection Playbook
      • Social Engineering Detection Playbook
      • Malicious Network Behaviour Detection Playbook
      • Windows Intrusion Detection Playbook
      • Vulnerability Detection Playbook
      • Business Email Compromise Detection Playbook
    • Process Execution (KQL Triage)
    • Threat Hunting
      • Hunting Ransomware Indicators
      • Hunting With KQL
        • Detecting Malware Infection (MITRE ATT&CK: T1566, T1059)
        • Discovery Activities (MITRE ATT&CK: T1016, T1083, T1046)
        • Credential Theft (MITRE ATT&CK: T1003, T1078)
        • Lateral Movement (MITRE ATT&CK: T1076, T1021)
        • Data Theft (MITRE ATT&CK: T1041, T1071)
        • Detecting CommandLine Executions (MITRE ATT&CK: T1059)
        • Windows Security Logs (Identity and Logon Activities)
      • Hunting With Splunk
Powered by GitBook
On this page
  • Introduction: The Need for Effective Scam Email Detection Capabilities
  • Table of Contents
  • 1. Initial Detection of Scam Activity
  • 2. Compromised Account Indicators
  • 3. Financial and Data Theft Indicators
  • 4. Threat Persistence
  • 5. Incident Response and Containment
  • 6. Conclusion
Edit on GitHub
  1. Detection Engineering
  2. Attack Triage Playbooks (KQL Triage)

Scam Detection Playbook

Introduction: The Need for Effective Scam Email Detection Capabilities

Scam emails remain a significant cybersecurity threat, targeting individuals and organisations with fraudulent schemes designed to steal sensitive information, financial assets, or login credentials. Cybercriminals use tactics such as impersonation, fake invoices, lottery scams, tech support fraud, and investment scams to deceive recipients into taking malicious actions. As scam emails become more sophisticated—often bypassing traditional spam filters and leveraging social engineering—organisations need advanced detection capabilities to prevent financial losses, data breaches, and reputational damage.

Effective scam email detection capabilities and processes are essential for identifying and mitigating fraudulent communications before they compromise users or systems. A comprehensive detection strategy should incorporate advanced email filtering, machine learning-based anomaly detection, domain reputation analysis, and integration with threat intelligence feeds to recognise scam indicators in real-time. Security solutions such as Security Email Gateways (SEGs), Security Information and Event Management (SIEM), and behavioural analytics enhance the ability to detect unusual email patterns, sender spoofing, and embedded phishing links.

To effectively combat scam email threats, organisations must implement continuous monitoring, automated alerts, and user education programs to improve awareness of scam tactics. By strengthening detection and response mechanisms, security teams can proactively identify fraudulent emails, reduce the risk of financial and operational impact, and enhance overall cybersecurity resilience.

Table of Contents

  1. Initial Detection of Scam Activity

    • Identify Scam Emails

    • Detect Unusual Click Activity on Scam URLs

    • Monitor Unusual Outbound Network Traffic

  2. Compromised Account Indicators

    • Login from Unusual Locations

    • Suspicious Email Rule Creation

    • Abnormal Authentication Patterns

  3. Financial and Data Theft Indicators

    • Monitor Unusual File Access

    • Detect Outbound Data Transfers

    • Identify Use of Financial Manipulation Tools

  4. Threat Persistence

    • Persistent Email Rules

    • OAuth Application Abuse

    • Advanced Indicators of Credential Abuse

  5. Incident Response and Containment

    • Isolate Compromised Accounts and Systems

    • Identify Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

    • Timeline Reconstruction

  6. Conclusion


This playbook provides a structured approach to detecting and analysing scam compromises within an organisation using Microsoft Defender and Sentinel. Each section includes advanced KQL queries with descriptions and expected results.

1. Initial Detection of Scam Activity

Query Option 1: Identify Scam Emails

EmailEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where Subject matches regex @"(urgent|invoice|payment|security alert|verify)"
| where SenderDomain endswith ".xyz" or SenderDomain endswith ".ru"
| project Timestamp, SenderEmailAddress, Subject, RecipientEmailAddress, SenderIP

Description: Identifies emails with suspicious subjects or domains commonly associated with scams. Results include sender details, recipients, and IP addresses.

Query Option 2: Detect Unusual Click Activity on Scam URLs

UrlClickEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where Url contains_any ("bit.ly", "tinyurl.com", "ow.ly", "redirect")
| summarize ClickCount = count() by UserId, Url
| where ClickCount > 5
| project UserId, Url, ClickCount

Description: Detects users clicking on shortened or suspicious URLs multiple times, which may indicate interaction with scam links. Results display users and URLs.

Query Option 3: Monitor Unusual Outbound Network Traffic

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public" and Protocol in ("HTTP", "HTTPS")
| summarize TotalRequests = count() by DeviceName, RemoteIPAddress
| where TotalRequests > 100
| project DeviceName, RemoteIPAddress, TotalRequests

Description: Monitors devices generating a high volume of outbound requests to public IPs, potentially to scam domains. Results highlight affected devices and IPs.


2. Compromised Account Indicators

Query Option 1: Login from Unusual Locations

SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where Location != "<expected_location>"
| summarize LoginCount = count() by UserPrincipalName, Location, IPAddress
| where LoginCount > 1
| project UserPrincipalName, Location, IPAddress, LoginCount

Description: Detects logins from unexpected geolocations. Results include user accounts, locations, and IP addresses.

Query Option 2: Suspicious Email Rule Creation

EmailRulesEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType == "Create" and RuleConditions contains "forward" and RecipientDomain != "<organization_domain>"
| project Timestamp, UserId, RuleName, RuleConditions

Description: Flags email forwarding rules to external domains, a common indicator of account compromise. Results display affected users and rule details.

Query Option 3: Abnormal Authentication Patterns

SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where ResultType == "Failure" and AuthenticationMethod != "ExpectedMethod"
| summarize FailureCount = count() by UserPrincipalName, IPAddress
| where FailureCount > 5
| project UserPrincipalName, IPAddress, FailureCount

Description: Identifies repeated authentication failures using unexpected methods. Results highlight affected users and associated IPs.


3. Financial and Data Theft Indicators

Query Option 1: Monitor Unusual File Access

DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType in ("FileRead", "FileCopied")
| where FolderPath contains "Finance" or FolderPath contains "Payroll"
| summarize FileAccessCount = count() by DeviceName, UserName
| where FileAccessCount > 10
| project DeviceName, UserName, FileAccessCount

Description: Tracks high-volume file access in sensitive folders, such as finance or payroll directories. Results display devices and users involved.

Query Option 2: Detect Outbound Data Transfers

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where BytesSent > 5000000
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIPAddress, BytesSent

Description: Identifies significant outbound data transfers, potentially indicating exfiltration. Results include source devices and destination IPs.

Query Option 3: Identify Use of Financial Manipulation Tools

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ProcessCommandLine contains_any ("macro", "vba", "excel.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName

Description: Flags processes that may indicate financial data manipulation. Results include process details and associated accounts.


4. Threat Persistence

Query Option 1: Persistent Email Rules

EmailRulesEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where RuleName contains "auto-forward" or RuleName contains "scam"
| project Timestamp, UserId, RuleName, RecipientDomain

Description: Detects persistent email forwarding rules. Results include rule names and associated accounts.

Query Option 2: OAuth Application Abuse

OAuthEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AppName != "TrustedApp" and ApprovalStatus == "Granted"
| project Timestamp, UserPrincipalName, AppName, AppId, ApprovalStatus

Description: Identifies unauthorized OAuth application approvals. Results include app details and affected accounts.

Query Option 3: Advanced Indicators of Credential Abuse

SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where AuthenticationDetails contains "Token" and UserPrincipalName in ("<sensitive_accounts>")
| project Timestamp, UserPrincipalName, AuthenticationDetails, IPAddress

Description: Flags token-based authentication for sensitive accounts, potentially indicating abuse. Results include accounts and IPs.


5. Incident Response and Containment

Query Option 1: Isolate Compromised Accounts and Systems

SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where UserPrincipalName in ("<compromised_accounts>")
| project Timestamp, UserPrincipalName, IPAddress, Location

Description: Tracks recent activity for known compromised accounts. Results help in isolating accounts.

Query Option 2: Identify Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

union DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceFileEvents, EmailEvents
| where SHA256 in ("<IoC-hashes>")
| project Timestamp, EventType = $table, DeviceName, FileName, SHA256

Description: Correlates IoCs with email, file, and process events. Results display impacted devices and files.

Query Option 3: Timeline Reconstruction

union EmailEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| project Timestamp, EventType = $table, DeviceName, SenderEmailAddress, ProcessCommandLine, RemoteIPAddress
| order by Timestamp asc

Description: Combines data sources to create a comprehensive timeline of scam-related activities. Results provide a detailed incident overview.


6. Conclusion

The playbook offers a good approach to detecting and analysing compromises in an environment. However, its usefulness depends on the environment and tools at your disposal. For an environment where KQL is an option, the queries may require some adaptation to specific data sources and infrastructure setup.

PreviousPhishing Email Compromise Detection PlaybookNextCustomer Phishing Detection Playbook

Last updated 4 months ago