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On this page
  • Domain Controller Events
  • Active Directory Certificate Services Certificate Authority (AD CS CA) Events
  • Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) Events
  • Microsoft Entra Connect Server Events
  • Computer Objects Configured for Unconstrained Delegation Events
  • Computer Objects Compromised by a Silver Ticket
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  1. Detection Engineering
  2. AD Attack Detections & Mitigations

Active Directory Events for Detecting Compromise

PreviousActive Directory Security ControlsNextAttack Triage Playbooks (KQL Triage)

Last updated 4 months ago

Recommended event IDs to log and monitor to detect the Active Directory compromises detailed in the sections

Domain Controller Events

The following events should be centrally logged and analysed to identify Active Directory compromises involving Domain Controllers.

Table 1. Events that detect compromises involving Domain Controllers

Event ID
Compromise
Description

39

AD CS

The KDC encountered a valid user certificate that could not be securely mapped to a user (such as via explicit mapping, key trust mapping, or a SID).

40

AD CS

A certificate is issued before the user exists in Active Directory, and no explicit mapping can be found. This event is only logged when the KDC is in Compatibility mode.

41

AD CS

A certificate contains the new SID extension, but it does not match the SID of the corresponding user account.

1103

Dumping ntds.dit, One-way Trust Bypass, SID History, Skeleton Key

The ‘Security’ audit log is cleared.

2889

Password Spray

A computer object tries to make an unsigned LDAP bind.

3033

Skeleton Key

A driver fails to load because it does not meet Microsoft’s signing requirements.

3063

Skeleton Key

A driver fails to load because it does not meet the security requirements for shared sections.

4103

Dumping ntds.dit, One-way Trust Bypass, SID History, Skeleton Key

PowerShell executes and logs pipeline execution details.

4104

Dumping ntds.dit, One-way Trust Bypass, SID History, Skeleton Key

PowerShell executes code to capture scripts and commands.

4624

Password Spray, MachineAccountQuota, Unconstrained Delegation

An account is successfully logged on

4625

AS-REP Roasting, Password Spray

An account fails to log on.

4656

Dumping ntds.dit

A handle to an object is requested.

4662

DCSync, Golden SAML

An operation is performed on an object.

4663

Dumping ntds.dit, Skeleton Key

An attempt is made to access an object.

4673

Skeleton Key

A privileged service is called.

4674

AD CS

An operation is attempted on a privileged object.

4675

SID History (Domain hopping with Golden Tickets and SID History)

SIDs were filtered

4688

Dumping ntds.dit

A new process is created.

4697

Skeleton Key

A service is installed in the system.

4703

Skeleton Key

A user right is adjusted.

4724

MachineAccountQuota

An attempt is made to reset an account's password.

4738

Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting, SID History

A user account is changed.

4740

Password Spray

A user account is locked out.

4741

MachineAccountQuota

A computer account was created in Active Directory.

4768

AS-REP Roasting, AD CS, Golden Ticket, One-way Trust Bypass

A Kerberos TGT is requested.

4769

Kerberoasting, Golden Ticket

A TGS is requested.

4770

Unconstrained Delegation

A Kerberos TGT is renewed.

4771

Password Spray

Kerberos pre-authentication fails.

5136

Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting

A directory service object was modified.

8222

Dumping ntds.dit

A shadow copy is created.

Active Directory Certificate Services Certificate Authority (AD CS CA) Events

The below events should be centrally logged and analysed to identify Active Directory compromises involving AD CS CA servers.

Table 2. Events that detect compromises involving AD CS CA servers

Event ID
Compromise
Description

1102

AD CS, Golden Certificate

The ‘Security’ audit log was cleared.

4103

Golden Certificate

PowerShell module logging.

4104

Golden Certificate

PowerShell script block logging.

4876

Golden Certificate

Certificate Services backup was started.

4886

AD CS

Certificate Services received a certificate request.

4887

AD CS

Certificate Services approved a certificate request and issued a certificate.

4899

AD CS

A Certificate Services template was updated.

4900

AD CS

Certificate Services template security was updated.

Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) Events

The events below should be centrally logged and analysed to identify active directory compromises involving AD FS servers.

Table 3. Events that detect compromises involving AD FS servers

Event ID
Compromise
Description

70

Golden SAML

A Certificate Private Key was acquired.

307

Golden SAML

The Federation Service configuration was changed.

510

Golden SAML

Additional information about events, such as federation service configuration changes, was requested.

1007

Golden SAML

A certificate was exported.

1102

Golden SAML

The ‘Security’ audit log was cleared.

1200

Golden SAML

The Federation Service issued a valid token.

1202

Golden SAML

The Federation Service validated a new credential.

Microsoft Entra Connect Server Events

The events should be centrally logged and analysed to identify Active Directory compromises involving Microsoft Entra Connect servers.

Table 4. Events that detect compromises involving Microsoft Entra Connect servers

Event ID
Compromise
Description

611

Microsoft Entra Connect

PHS failed for the domain.

650

Microsoft Entra Connect

Password synchronisation starts retrieving updated passwords from the on-premises AD DS.

651

Microsoft Entra Connect

Password synchronisation finishes retrieving updated passwords from the on-premises AD DS.

656

Microsoft Entra Connect

Password synchronisation indicates that a password change was detected and there was an attempt to sync it to Microsoft Entra ID.

657

Microsoft Entra Connect

A password was successfully synced for a user object.

1102

Microsoft Entra Connect

The security audit log was cleared.

4103

Microsoft Entra Connect

PowerShell module logging.

4104

Microsoft Entra Connect

PowerShell script block logging.

Computer Objects Configured for Unconstrained Delegation Events

The events below should be centrally logged and analysed to identify Active Directory compromises involving computer objects configured for unconstrained delegation.

Table 5. Events that detect compromises involving computer objects configured for unconstrained delegation

Event ID
Compromise
Description

4103

Unconstrained delegation

PowerShell executes and logs pipeline execution details.

4104

Unconstrained delegation

PowerShell executes code to capture scripts and commands.

4624

Unconstrained delegation

An account is successfully logged on.

4688

Unconstrained delegation

A new process is created.

Computer Objects Compromised by a Silver Ticket

The following events should be centrally logged and analysed to identify Active Directory compromises involving Silver Tickets.

Table 6. Events that detect Silver Ticket compromises

Event ID
Compromise
Description

4624

Silver Ticket

This event is generated when an account is logged into a computer. It can be correlated and analysed with event 4627 for signs of a potential Silver Ticket.

4627

Silver Ticket

This event is generated alongside event 4624 and provides additional information regarding the group membership of the account that logged in. This event can be analysed for discrepancies, such as mismatching SID and group membership information for the user object that logged on. Note that a Silver Ticket forges the TGS, which can contain false information, such as a different SID to the user object logging on and different group memberships. Malicious actors falsify this information to escalate their privileges on the target computer object.

Reference

Detect and Mitigate Active Directory Compromise
Microsoft Identity and Access documentation
Detecting and mitigating Active Directory compromises
Best Practices for Securing Active Directory
Securing Domain Controllers Against Attack
Top 25 Active Directory Security Best Practices