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On this page
  • Interesting Log Sources
  • User Account Access
  • User Account Management
  • Remote Desktop Activity
  • Hunting Persistence
  • PowerShell Activity
  • File sharing
  • Remote login
  • RDP
  • SSH
  • Remote Execution
  • Pass-The-Hash-Ticket (WCE)
  • Pass-The-Hash-Ticket (Mimikatz)
  • PsExec
  • Remote Services
  • Scheduled Task
  • WinRM and Powershell
  • SMB
  • File Transfer
  • Important Security Event IDs
  • Logon type corresponding to successful (4624) or Failed logins (4625)
  • Other’s log important Event IDs
Edit on GitHub
  1. DFIR
  2. Playbooks
  3. First Responder DFIR Playbook
  4. Windows Forensic Artefacts

Windows Event Logs

Description

Windows Event Logs are separated into different log roles and record a wide range of events on the Windows host.

There are many Event Logs in the evtx folder, some aimed at system-wide events like Security.evtx, System.evtx, and Application.evtx. Others may contain more specific events. All Event Logs are stored in the same format, but the actual data elements collected vary. This variation of data elements makes the correlation of Event Logs a challenge. This is where EvtxECmd shines. All events are normalised across all event types and all Event Logs file types!

The EvtxECmd parser has custom maps and locked file support. EvtxECmd has a unique feature, “Maps,” that allows for consistent output. Event Log Location: Event Logs for Windows Vista or later are found in %systemroot%\System32\winevt\logs. Parsing all events could end in millions of results. Using EvtxCMD's maps can help target specific artefacts.

Location

C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs

Caveats

Some Windows hosts may have different logging options

Forensic Analysis Tools

  • EvtxECmd (Zimmerman tool)

Basic Usage

Recursively parsing a directory of event logs is probably the most efficient way to use EvtxECmd. To parse a directory, copy Event Logs to a temporary directory and use the -d option. Additionally, use the --inc option to only include specific EventIDs in the processing.

You have extracted the Event Log to a folder named e:\evtx\logs, and now you want to process all those logs in a single command.

EvtxECmd.exe -d E:\evtx\logs --csv G:\evtx\out --csvf evtxecmd_out.csv 

Process all event logs and only include event_id specifi ed by the --inc option

EvtxECmd.exe -d E:\evtx\logs --csv G:\evtx\out --csvf evtxecmd_out.csv --inc 4624,4625,4634,4647,4672

Exclude specific event_id’s by using the -exc option

EvtxECmd.exe -d E:\evtx\logs --csv G:\evtx\out --csvf evtxecmd_out.csv --exc 4656,4660,4663

Key Data Returned

Events without maps are still processed, but output format will vary. The normalized Event Log output makes it possible to analyze many different types of Event Logs in a single view. Timeline Explorer is perfect for this analysis.

Output Fields


Interesting Log Sources

Log sources
Context

Security.evtx

Security-related events

System.evtx

Tracks system component events

Application.evtx

Logs application-specific events

Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational.evtx

Enhanced process, network, and file monitoring

Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/4Operational.evtx

Records PowerShell activity

Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational.evtx

Logs Windows Defender events

Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/4Operational.evtx

Logs WMI events

Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManager%4Operational.evtx

Logs RDP session events

Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-LocalSessionManager/Operational.evtx

Logs RDP session events

Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational.evtx

Logs Task Scheduler events

Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Server%4Operational.evtx

Active Directory Server Logs

Directory Service.evtx

Active Directory Server Logs

File Replication Service.evtx

Active Directory Server Logs

%SystemDrive%\inetpub\logs\LogFiles

IIS log

%SystemRoot%\System32\LogFiles\HTTPERR

IIS log

%ProgramFiles%\Microsoft\Exchange Server\V15\Logging

Exchange log

Panther*.log

Windows setup details

RPC Client Access*.log

Exchange Server, if applicable

Third party antivirus log

AV logs


User Account Access

EventID
Description
Forensic Analysis

4624

An account was successfully logged on

This event can identify a user logon time and the method that they logged on. The “Logon Type” field is critical to determining the logon method

4625

An account failed to logon

This may indicate brute-force attempts to access the account or mistakes made by a threat actor when attempting to logon as a legitimate user

4648

A logon was attempted using explicit credentials

This can highlight the usage of the “runas” command and may indicate compromised accounts. Other logs must be correlated to provide context to these events

4672

Special privileges assigned to a new logon

These events should be correlated against accounts that have high-level and administrator-level permissions. It is normal for SYSTEM to generate a high-volume of these events


User Account Management

EventID
Description
Forensic Analysis

4720

A user account was created

The creation of new users on a host can be an indicator of a threat actor trying to blend in with normal activity

4722

A user account was enabled

A threat actor may utilise dormant accounts with access to privileged groups. Unexpected enablement or re-enablement of accounts should be investigated

4724

An attempt was made to reset an accounts password

Resetting an account password by a TA can provide a persistence mechanism and potentially lock out a legitimate user

4728, 4732, 4756

Group membership changes

A threat actor may attempt to add their compromised user account to other domain groups in order to access other areas of the network


Remote Desktop Activity

EventID
Description
Forensic Analysis

46241 (Type 10)

An account was successfully logged on

A Type 10 4624 event indicates that a user performed a logon via the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)

1149

User authentication succeeded

This event shows that a connection was made over RDP. However, it is not indicative of a logon event. The username and IP address of the source host may be available within this event

21

Remote Desktop Services: Session logon succeeded

Indicates a successful logon via RDP if the source network address is not "LOCAL.". The username and source IP address may be available within this event

24

Remote Desktop Services: Session has been disconnected

The user has disconnected from an RDP session

25

Remote Desktop Services: Session reconnection succeeded

The user has reconnected to an RDP session


Hunting Persistence

EventID
Description
Forensic Analysis

7045

New Service Creation

This is recorded in the system log when a new service is installed

4697

A service was installed in the system

Security log entry for new service creation

4698

A scheduled task was created

Similar to service creation, security log track the creation of scheduled tasks


PowerShell Activity

EventID & Channel
Description

4104

PowerShell ScriptBlock Logging

When enabled, this event will record the PowerShell script that has been executed


File sharing

Windows Admin share (net use)

Commonly for transferring their tools and malware. Or it can be abused to exfiltrate data.

Event Log
Event ID
Computer

Security

4648

Source

SMBClient-Security

31001

Source

Security

4624, 4672, 4776, 4768, 4769, 5140, 5145

Destination

Filesystem
Location
Computer

Prefetch, MFT, USNJ

C:\Windows\Prefetch\net.EXE-RANDOM.pf and C:\Windows\Prefetch\net1.EXE-RANDOM.pf

Source

Jumplist

C:\Users\USERNAME\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\AutomaticDestinations\

Source

USNJ or MFT

Created file

Source

Registry
Findings
Computer

User Profile (NTUSER.DAT)

NTUSER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MountPoints2

Source

USRCLASS.dat

Shellbags (Remote folders accessed)

Source

Shimcache (SYSTEM)

net.exe and net1.exe

Source

BAM/DAM (SYSTEM)

Last time executed net.exe and net1.exe

Source

Amcache.hve

First Execution time of net.exe and net1.exe

Source


Remote login

An attacker might utilise the remote login feature such as RDP, VNC, external software or SSH to login remotely

RDP

Event Log
Event ID
Computer

Security

4648

Source

RDPClient Operational

1024, 1025, 1026, 1102

Source

Security

4624 (logon type 10 or 12), 4778, 4779

Destination

RDPCoreTS Operational

131, 98, 99

Destination

RemoteConnection Manager Operational

1149

Destination

RemoteConnection Manager Admin

1158

Destination

LocalSession Manager Operational

21, 23, 24, 25, 41

Destination

Filesystem
Location
Computer

Prefetch, MFT, USNJ

C:\Windows\Prefetch\MSTSC.EXE-RANDOM.pf

Source

Jumplist

C:\Users\USERNAME\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\AutomaticDestinations\ (MSTSC-APPID-automaticDestinations-ms)

Source

Bitmap Cache

C:\Users\USERNAME\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Cache\*

Source

Prefetch, MFT, USNJ

C:\Windows\Prefetch\rdpclip.exe-RANDOM.pf and C:\Windows\Prefetch\tstheme.exe-RANDOM.pf

Destination

Registry
Findings
Computer

User Profile (NTUSER.DAT)

NTUSER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers

Source

Shimcache (SYSTEM)

mstsc.exe

Source

BAM/DAM (SYSTEM)

Last Execution time of mstsc.exe

Source

Amcache.hve

First Execution time of mstsc.exe

Source

UserAssist (NTUSER.dat)

Last Execution time and Numbers of Times of mstsc.exe

Source

RecentApps (NTUSER.DAT)

Last Execution time and Numbers of Times of mstsc.exe

Source

ShimCache (SYSTEM)

rdpclip.exe and tstheme.exe

Destination

AmCache.hve

rdpclip.exe and tstheme.exe

Destination


SSH

Event Log
Event ID
Computer

Security

4624,4625,4688, 5154

Destination

System

10016

Destination

Filesystem
Location
Computer

Prefetch, MFT, USNJ

C:\Windows\Prefetch\[SSH executable].exe-RANDOM.pf

Destination

Registry
Findings
Computer

User Profile (NTUSER.DAT)

Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\SshHostKeys

Destination


Remote Execution

Pass-The-Hash-Ticket (WCE)

Event Log
Event ID
Computer

System

7045, 7036 (WCESERVICE)

Source

Security

4624, 4634

Destination

Security

4776, 4771, 5156

DC

Filesystem
Location
Computer

Prefetch, MFT, USNJ

C:\Windows\Prefetch\[Tool name].exe-RANDOM.pf

Source

USNJ

wceaux.dll`

Source


Pass-The-Hash-Ticket (Mimikatz)

Event Log
Event ID
Computer

Security

4624, 4672, 4634

Destination

Security

4776, 4771, 5156, 4769

DC

Filesystem
Location
Computer

Prefetch, MFT, USNJ

C:\Windows\Prefetch\[Tool name].exe-RANDOM.pf

Source

Prefetch, MFT, USNJ

C:\Windows\Prefetch\WMIC.EXE-[RANDOM].pf

Source


PsExec

Event Log
Event ID
Computer

Security

4648

Source

Security

4624 (Logon type 3 or 2), 4672, 5140

Destination

System

7045, 7036

Destination

Filesystem
Location
Computer

Prefetch, MFT, USNJ

C:\Windows\Prefetch\[Executable File Name of Tool]-[RANDOM].pf

Source

MFT, USNJ

psexec.exe executable

Source

Prefetch, MFT, USNJ

C:\Windows\Prefetch\PSEXESVC.EXE-RANDOM.pf

Destination

C:\Windows

psexesvc.exe or renamed executable

Destination

Registry
Findings
Computer

User Profile (NTUSER.DAT)

NTUSER\SOFTWARE\Sysinternals\PsExec\EulaAccepted

Source

Shimcache (SYSTEM)

psexec.exe

Source

BAM/DAM (SYSTEM)

Last execution time ofpsexec.exe

Source

Amcache.hve

First Execution time of psexec.exe

Source

SYSTEM

SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\PSEXESVC

Destination

Shimcache (SYSTEM)

psexecsvc.exe

Destination

Amcache.hve

First Execution time of psexecsvc.exe

Destination


Remote Services

Event Log
Event ID
Computer

Security

4624 (Logon type 3), 4697

Destination

System

7034, 7035, 7036, 7040, 7045

Destination

Filesystem
Location
Computer

Prefetch, MFT, USNJ

C:\Windows\Prefetch\sc.exe-RANDOM.pf

Source

Prefetch, MFT, USNJ

C:\Windows\Prefetch\evil.exe-RANDOM.pf

Destination

File disk

Creation of evil.exe or dll

Destination

Registry
Findings
Computer

BAM/DAM (SYSTEM)

sc.exe

Source

Shimcache (SYSTEM)

sc.exe

Source

Amcache.hve

First Execution time of sc.exe

Source

SYSTEM

\CurrentControlSet\Services\

Destination

Shimcache (SYSTEM)

evil.exe

Destination

Amcache.hve

First Execution time of evil.exe

Destination


Scheduled Task

Event Log
Event ID
Computer

Security

4648

Source

Security

4672, 4624, 4698, 4702, 4699, 4700, 4701

Destination

Task scheduler Operational

106, 140, 141, 200, 201

Destination

Filesystem
Location
Computer

Prefetch, MFT, USNJ

C:\Windows\Prefetch\SCHTASKS.EXE-[RANDOM].pf

Source

Prefetch, MFT, USNJ

C:\Windows\Prefetch\at.EXE-[RANDOM].pf

Source

Prefetch, MFT, USNJ

C:\Windows\Prefetch\TASKENG.EXE-[RANDOM].pf

Destination

Prefetch, MFT, USNJ

C:\Windows\Prefetch\evil.EXE-[RANDOM].pf

Destination

Job files

C:\Windows\Tasks

Destination

Task files

C:\Wmdows\System32\Tasks

Destination

Registry
Findings
Computer

BAM/DAM (SYSTEM)

at.exe and schtasks.exe

Source

Shimcache (SYSTEM)

at.exe and schtasks.exe

Source

Amcache.hve

at.exe and schtasks.exe

Source

Shimcache (SYSTEM)

evil.exe

Destination

Amcache.hve

First Execution time of evil.exe

Destination

SYSTEM

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\*

Destination


WMIC

Event Log
Event ID
Computer

Security

4648

Source

Security

4624, 4672

Destination

WMI Activity Operational

5857,5860,5861

Destination

Filesystem
Location
Computer

Prefetch, MFT, USNJ

C:\Windows\Prefetch\WMIC.EXE-[RANDOM].pf

Source

Prefetch, MFT, USNJ

C:\Windows\Prefetch\evil.exe-[RANDOM].pf

Destination

Prefetch, MFT, USNJ

C:\Windows\Prefetch\scrcons.exe-[RANDOM].pf

Destination

Prefetch, MFT, USNJ

C:\Windows\Prefetch\mofcomp.exe-[RANDOM].pf

Destination

Prefetch, MFT, USNJ

C:\Windows\Prefetch\wmiprvse.exe-[RANDOM].pf

Destination

WMI repository

C:\Windows\System32\wbem\Repository

Destination

File creation

evil.exe or evil.mof

Destination

Registry
Findings
Computer

Shimcache (SYSTEM)

Wmic.exe

Source

BAM/DAM (SYSTEM)

Wmic.exe

Source

Amcache.hve

First Execution time of Wmic.exe

Source

ShimCache (SYSTEM)

scrcons.exe, mofcomp.exe, wmiprvse.exe, evil.exe

Destination

AmCache.hve

scrcons.exe, mofcomp.exe, wmiprvse.exe, evil.exe

Destination


WinRM and Powershell

Event Log
Event ID
Computer

Security

4648

Source

WinRM Operational

6,8,15,16,33

Source

Powershell Operational

40691, 40692, 8193, 8194, 8197

Source

Security

4624, 4672

Destination

Powershell Operational

4103, 4104, 53504

Destination

Powershell

400, 403, 800

Destination

WinRM

91, 168

Destination

Filesystem
Location
Computer

Prefetch, MFT, USNJ

C:\Windows\Prefetch\powershell.exe-RANDOM.pf

Source

Conmand history

C:\Users\USERNAME\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadline\ConsoleHost_history.txt

Source

Prefetch, MFT, USNJ

C:\Windows\Prefetch\evil.exe-RANDOM.pf

Destination

Prefetch, MFT, USNJ

C:\Windows\Prefetch\wsmprovhost.exe-RANDOM.pf

Destination

Registry
Findings
Computer

Shimcache (SYSTEM)

Powershell.exe

Source

BAM/DAM (SYSTEM)

Powershell.exe

Source

Amcache.hve

First Execution time of Powershell.exe

Source

ShimCache (SYSTEM)

wsmprovhost.exe and evil.exe

Destination

SOFTWARE

Microsoft\PowerShell\1\ShellIds\Microsoft.Powershell\ExecutionPolicy

Destination

AmCache.hve

wsmprovhost.exe and evil.exe

Destination


SMB

Event Log
Event ID
Computer

Security

4688,4624,4656,5140,5142,5143,5144,5145

Source

SMB Server Operational

4100,4103,4104,800,4104,40961,40962

Source


DCOM

Event Log
Event ID
Computer

Security

4624,4662, 4688, 4697, 4698, 4702

Destination


File Transfer

Event Log
Event ID
Computer

Security

4688

Destination

Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/ Operational

4103, 4104

Destination


Important Security Event IDs

IDs
Event log
Context

4624

Security

Successful Login

4625

Security

Failed Login

4634/4647

Security

User Initiated Logoff/An Account was Logged Off

4648

Security

A Logon was Attempted Using Explicit Credentials

4662

Security

An Operation was Performed on an Object

4663

Security

An Attempt was Made to Access an Object

4672

Security

Special Logon

4688

Security

Process Creation

4689

Security

Process Termination

4697

Security

Service Installed

4698/4702/4700

Security

Scheduled Task Created or Updated

4699

Security

Scheduled Task Deleted

4701

Security

Scheduled Task Enabled

4702

Security

Service Removed

4720

Security

A User Account was Created

4722

Security

A User Account was Enabled

4723

Security

An Attempt was Made to Change an Account’s Password

4724

Security

An Attempt was Made to Reset an Account’s Password

4725

Security

A User Account was Disabled

4726

Security

A User Account was Deleted

4728

Security

A Member was Added to a Security-Enabled Global Group

4729

Security

A Member was Removed from a Security-Enabled Global Group

4732

Security

A Security-Enabled Local Group was Created

4733

Security

A Security-Enabled Local Group was Changed

4734

Security

A Security-Enabled Local Group was Deleted

4741

Security

A Computer Account was Created

4742

Security

A Computer Account was Changed

4768

Security (DC)

Kerberos TGT request

4769

Security (DC)

Kerberos Service Ticket request

4771

Security

Locked Out Account

4776

Security

NTLM authentication

4778

Security

Session Reconnected

4779

Security

Session Disconnected by User

4794

Security

An Attempt was Made to Set the Directory Services Restore Mode Administrator Password

5136

Security

Directory Service Changes

5140

Security

A Network Share Object was Accessed

5141

Security

A Directory Service Object was Deleted

5145

Security

Network Share Object was Checked

5376

Security

Credential Manager Credentials Submitted

5377

Security

Credential Manager Credentials Auto-Logon

1102

Security

Event Log Cleared

1100

Security

Event Log Service Shutdown


Logon type corresponding to successful (4624) or Failed logins (4625)

Logon Type
Explanation

2

Logon via console

3

Network Logon. A user or computer logged on to this computer from the network

4

Batch Logon (Task scheduler and AT)

5

Windows Service logon

7

Credentials used to unlock screen

8

Network logon sending credentials (cleartext)

9

Different credentials used than logon user

10

Remote Interactive logon (RDP)

11

Cached credentials used to logon

12

Cached remote interactive (RDP)

13

Cached Unlock (Similar to logon type 7)


Other’s log important Event IDs

IDs
Event log
Context

7045

System

Service installed

7034

System

The service terminated unexpectedly

7035

System

Service Control Manager

7036

System

Service State Change

7040

System

Service was changed from disabled to auto start.

7001

System

Service Start Failed

1001

System

BSOD

6005

System

Start-up time of the machine

6006

System

Shutdown time of the machine

104

System

Log cleared

59

MicrosoftWindows Bits Client/operational

Bits Jobs

2004

Microsoft-Windows-Windows Firewall with Advanced Security

Rule has been added to the Window Firewall exception list

2006

Microsoft-Windows-Windows Firewall with Advanced Security

Deleted firewall rule

1116

Microsoft Windows Windows Defender/Operational

Defender Antivirus has detected malware

1117

Microsoft Windows Windows Defender/Operational

Action taken

1006

Microsoft Windows Windows Defender/Operational

Scan result

4103

Microsoft Windows PowerShell/Operational

Module logging

4104

Microsoft Windows PowerShell/Operational

Script Block Logging

4105

Microsoft Windows PowerShell/Operational

Transcription Logging

4688

Microsoft Windows PowerShell/Operational

Process Creation (including PowerShell processes)

400

Windows PowerShell

Start of a PowerShell activity, whether local or remote.

403

Windows PowerShell

Completion of a PowerShell activity

800

Windows PowerShell

Pipeline execution

1000

Application

Application Error/crash

1001

Application

Application Error reporting

1002

Application

Application Hang

1024

Application

Software Installation

1040

Application

User Initiated Software Installation

1033

Application

Software installed

1034

Application

Windows Installer removed the product

11707

Application

Installation operation completed successfully

11708

Application

Installation failed

11724

Application

Installation completed successfully

1

Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational

Process Creation

2

Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational

A process changed a file creation time

3

Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational

Network connection detected

6

Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational

Driver Loaded

7

Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational

Image Loaded

8

Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational

CreateRemoteThread

10

Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational

ProcessAccess

11

Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational

FileCreate

12

Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational

RegistryEvent (Object create and delete)

1149

Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManager%4Operational

RDP User authentication succeeded

21

Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManager%4Operational

RDP Session logon succeeded

24

Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManager%4Operational

RDP Session has been disconnected

25

Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManager%4Operational

RDP Session reconnection succeeded

131

RDPCoreTS

RDP connection is first established

106

Task Scheduler

New scheduled task is created

140

Task Scheduler

New scheduled task is created

141

Task Scheduler

User deleted Task Scheduler task

200

Task Scheduler

Task executed

201

Task Scheduler

Task scheduler successfully completed the task

5857

WMI-Activity Operational

WMI activity is detected

5858

WMI-Activity Operational

WMI error

5859

WMI-Activity Operational

Subscription-based activity

5860

WMI-Activity Operational

Detailed subscription-based activity

5861

WMI-Activity Operational

Permanent subscription activity

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Last updated 3 months ago