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On this page
  • Authentication Events
  • Logon Event Types
  • User Accounts
  • Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) Usage
  • RDP Bitmap Cache (BMC)
  • Successful/Failed Logons
  • Last Login and Password Change
  • NTUSER.DAT
  • Security Account Manager (SAM)
  • User Access Logging (UAL)
  • Cloud Account Details
  • Last Login and Password Change
  • Service Events
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  1. DFIR
  2. Windows Forensics
  3. Window Artifact Analysis

Account Usage

Authentication Events

Description: Authentication Events identify where authentication of credentials occurred. They can be particularly useful when tracking local vs. domain account usage.

Location:

%SYSTEM ROOT%\System32\winevt\logs\Security.evtx

Interpretation:

  • Recorded on the system that authenticated credential

  • Local Account/Workgroup = on workstation

  • Domain/Active Directory = on the domain controller

  • Event ID Codes (NTLM protocol)

  • 4776: Successful/Failed account authentication

  • Event ID Codes (Kerberos protocol)

  • 4768: Ticket Granting Ticket was granted (successful logon)

  • 4769: Service Ticket requested (access to server resource)

  • 4771: Pre-authentication failed (failed logon)

Logon Event Types

Description: Logon Events provide very specific information regarding the nature of account authorizations on a system. In addition to date, time, username, hostname, and success/failure status of a logon, Logon Events also enable us to determine by exactly what means a logon was attempted.

Location:

%SYSTEM ROOT%\System32\winevt\logs\Security.evtx

Interpretation: Event ID 4624 Logon Type Explanation 2 Logon via console 3 Network Logon 4 Batch Logon 5 Windows Service Logon 7 Credentials used to unlock screen; RDP session reconnect 8 Network logon sending credentials (cleartext) 9 Different credentials used than logged on user 10 Remote interactive logon (RDP) 11 Cached credentials used to logon 12 Cached remote interactive (similar to Type 10) 13 Cached unlock (similar to Type 7)

User Accounts

Description: Identify local and domain accounts with interactive logins to the system.

Location:

SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\ProfileList

Interpretation:

  • Useful for mapping SID to user account name

  • Subkeys are named for user SIDs and contain a ProfileImagePath indicating the user’s profile path

Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) Usage

Description: Track RDP logons and session reconnections to target machines.

Location:

Security Log

%SYSTEM ROOT%\System32\winevt\logs\Security.evtx

Interpretation:

  • Multiple events can be used to track accounts used for RDP

  • Event ID 4624 – Logon Type 10

  • Event ID 4778 – Session Connected/Reconnected

  • Event ID 4779 – Session Disconnected

  • Event log provides the hostname and IP address of the remote machine making the connection.

  • Multiple dedicated RDP/Terminal Services logs are also available on modern Windows versions

RDP Bitmap Cache (BMC)

Description: RDP is a known protocol developed by Microsoft that allows users to connect to other Windows operating systems with GUI. RDP Bitmap Cache was implemented to enhance the RDP user experience and reduce the data throughput on the network. It stores bitmap-sized images of RDP sessions into a file so that the session reuses these images and reduces the potential lag.

Location:

%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Cache

Tools For Investigation:

bitmapcacheviewer.exe
bmc-tools .py

Forensic Value:

  1. RDP session photos, screenshots, images, captures

  2. RDP activity evidence, in the case of the target system, the artifact is collected from the client side

Successful/Failed Logons

Description: Profile account creation, attempted logons, and account usage.

Location:

% SYSTEM ROOT%\System32\winevt\logs\Security.evtx

Interpretation:

  • 4624 – Successful Logon

  • 4625 – Failed Logon

  • 4634 | 4647 – Successful Logoff

  • 4648 – Logon using explicit credentials (runas)

  • 4672 – Account logon with superuser rights (Administrator)

  • 4720 – An account was created

Last Login and Password Change

Description: The SAM registry hive maintains a list of local accounts and associated configuration information and it Lists the last time the password of a specific local user has been changed.

Location:

C:\Windows\system32\config\SAM
SAM\Domains\Account\Users

Interpretation:

  • Accounts listed by their relative identifiers (RID)

  • Last login time, last password change, login counts, group membership, account creation time and more can be determined

  • Only the last logon and password change time will be stored in the registry key

NTUSER.DAT

Description: It’s a hidden file in every user profile and contains the settings and preferences for each user. Windows accomplishes this by first storing that information in the Registry in the HKEY_CURRENT_USER hive. Then, when the user signs out or shuts down, Windows saves that information to the NTUSER.DAT file. The next time the user sign in, Windows will load NTUSER.DAT to memory, and all preferences load to the Registry again.

Location:

C:\Users\<username>\NTUSER.DAT

Tools For Investigation:

RegRipper (rr. exe) , RECmd.exe , RegistryExplorer.exe

RECmd.exe --f "C:\Temp\UsrClass 1.dat" --sk URL --recover false --nl
RECmd.exe --f "D:\temp\UsrClass 1.dat" --StartDate "11/13/2014 15:35:01"
RECmd.exe --f "D:\temp\UsrClass 1.dat" --RegEx --sv "(App|Display)Name"

Forensic Value:

  1. Collecting registry hive ( HKEY_CURRENT_ USER) through its supporting file ( NTUSER.DAT)

  2. Forensic data user activity, setting via registry hive

  3. Forensic artifacts (Recent Docs, Typed URLs, UserAssist, Recent Apps, Run and Run Once, ComDig32 Subkey, Typed Paths Subkey, Microsoft Office applications and the MRU subkey, RunMRU, Windows search function and the WordWheelQuery

Security Account Manager (SAM)

Description Security Account Manager (SAM) is a database file in Windows that stores users' passwords. It can be used to authenticate local and remote users. SAM uses cryptographic measures to prevent unauthenticated users from accessing the system. The user passwords are stored in a hashed format in a registry hive, either as an LM or NTLM hash.

Location:

C:\Windows\System32\config\SAM

Tools For Investigation:

RegRipper (rr. exe), samparser.py

Forensic Value:

  1. User information

  2. Group information

  3. Authentication information

  4. User’s security settings

  5. Login count

User Access Logging (UAL)

Description: UAL is a feature included by default in Server editions of Microsoft Windows only, starting with Server 2012. Microsoft defines UAL as a feature that logs unique client access requests, in the form of IP addresses and usernames, of installed products and roles on the local server.

Location:

C:\Windows\System32\LogFiles\Sum\*.mdb

Tools For Investigation:

SumECmd.exe, KStrike.py

SumECmd.exe -d "C:\Temp\sum" --csv "C:\Temp\"

Forensic Value:

  1. Service accessed

  2. The user account that performed the access

  3. User’s source IP

  4. Last Access Time

  5. Total Accesses

  6. Type of authentication access

Cloud Account Details

Description: Microsoft Cloud Accounts stores account information in the SAM hive, including the email address associated with the account.

Location:

SAM\Domains\Account\Users\<RID>\InternetUserName

Interpretation:

  • InternetUserName value contains the email address tied to the account

  • The presence of this value identifies the account as a Microsoft cloud account

Last Login and Password Change

Description: The SAM registry hive maintains a list of local accounts and associated configuration information.

Location:

  • SAM\Domains\Account\Users Interpretation

  • Accounts listed by their relative identifiers (RID)

  • Last login time, last password change, login counts, group membership, account creation time and more can be determined.

Service Events

Description: Analyse logs for suspicious Windows service creation, persistence, and services that started or stopped around the time of a suspected compromise. Service events also record account information.

Location:

%SYSTEM ROOT%\System32\winevt\logs\System.evtx
%SYSTEM ROOT%\System32\winevt\logs\Security.evtx

Interpretation:

  • Most relevant events are present in the System Log:

  • 7034 – Service crashed unexpectedly

  • 7035 – Service sent a Start/Stop control

  • 7036 – Service started or stopped

  • 7040 – Start type changed (Boot | On Request | Disabled)

  • 7045 – A service was installed on the system (Win2008R2+)

  • Auditing can be enabled in the Security log on Win10+:

  • 4697 – A service was installed on the system (from Security log)

  • A large amount of malware and worms in the wild utilize Services

  • Services started on boot illustrate persistence (desirable in malware)

  • Services can crash due to attacks like process injection

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Last updated 4 months ago