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On this page
  • USB Device Identification
  • Drive Letter and Volume Name
  • User Information
  • Connection Timestamps (First & Last Times)
  • Volume Serial Number (VSN)
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  1. DFIR
  2. Playbooks
  3. First Responder DFIR Playbook
  4. Windows Forensic Artefacts

External Device Usage

Which devices have connected to the host?

What are the names of the files and folders that have been accessed on the external device?

USB Device Identification

Description

Track USB devices plugged into a machine.

Location

SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USBSTOR
SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USB
SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\SCSI
SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\HID

Interpretation

  • Identify vendor, product, and version of a USB device plugged into a machine

  • Determine the first and last times a device was plugged into the machine

  • Devices that do not have a unique internal serial number will have an “&” in the second character of the serial number

  • The internal serial number provided in these keys may not match the serial number printed on the device

  • ParentIdPrefix links the USB key to SCSI key

  • SCSI<ParentIdPrefix>\Device Parameters\Partmgr\DiskId matches Partition/Diagnostic log and Windows Portable Devices key

  • Different versions of Windows store this data for different amounts of time. Windows 10/11 can store up to one year of dat

  • Some older data may be present in SYSTEM\Setup\Upgrade\PnP\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceMigration

  • HID key tracks peripherals connected to the system

Drive Letter and Volume Name

Description: Discover a device's last drive letter and volume name when plugged into the system.

Location

SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Portable Devices\Devices
SYSTEM\MountedDevices Examine available drive letter values looking for a serial number match in value data
SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Search\VolumeInfoCache

Interpretation

  • Only the last USB device mapped to a specific drive letter can be identified. Historical records are not available.

User Information

Description: Identify user accounts tied to a unique USB Device.

Location:

Document device Volume GUID from SYSTEM\MountedDevices
NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MountPoints2

Interpretation

If a Volume GUID match is made within MountPoints2, we can conclude the associated user profile was logged in while that device was present.

Connection Timestamps (First & Last Times)

Description

Connection timestamps are recorded when USB devices are connected to the Windows local host.

Location

C:\Windows\inf\setupapi.dev.log
C:\Windows\System32\config\SOFTWARE
C:\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM
C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs

Caveats

The timestamps are recorded in the local timezone

Forensic Analysis Tools

  • USBDView

  • Registry Explorer

Forensic Value

  • Search for Device Serial Number

  • Log File times are set to local time zone Location First, Last, and Removal Times

  • USB device connection timestamps

  • USB device connection history

  • USB device serial number

  • Last removal timestamp

SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USBSTOR\Disk&Ven_&Prod_\USBSerial#\Properties\{83da6326-97a6-4088-9453-a19231573b29}\####
 SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\SCSI\Ven_Prod_Version\USBSerial#\Properties\{83da6326-97a6-4088-9453-a19231573b29}\####
- 0064 = First Install (Win7+)
- 0066 = Last Connected (Win8+)
- 0067 = Last Removal (Win8+)

Interpretation

  • Timestamps are stored in Windows 64-bit FILETIME format.

Location

Connection Times

%SYSTEM ROOT%\System32\winevt\logs\Microsoft-Windows-Partition/Diagnostic.evtx

Interpretation

  • Event ID 1006 is recorded for each device connect/disconnect

  • Log cleared during major OS updates

Volume Serial Number (VSN)

Description: Discover the VSN assigned to the file system partition on the USB. (NOTE: This is not the USB Unique Serial Number, which is hardcoded into the device firmware, nor the serial number on any external labels attached.)

Location

SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVersion\EMDMgmt
  • Find a key match using the volume name and USB unique serial number:

  • Find the last integer number in the matching line

  • Convert decimal value to hex serial number

  • This key is often missing from modern systems using SSD devices

  • Win10+: %SYSTEM ROOT%\System32\winevt\logs\Microsoft-Windows-Partition/Diagnostic.evtx

  • Event ID 1006 may include VBR data, which contains the VSN

  • VSN is 4 bytes located at offsets 0x43 (FAT), 0x64 (exFAT), or 0x48 (NTFS) within each VBR

  • Log cleared during major OS updates

Interpretation

The VSN and device volume name can help correlate devices to specific files via shell items in LNK files and registry locations.

USB Device Serial Number

SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USBStor

Volume Serial Number (as decimal)

SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\EMDMgmt

Associated User (with GUID)

NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Mountpoints2

USB Device Vendor ID (VID) & Product ID (PID)

SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USB

Mounted Drive Letters

SYSTEM\MountedDevices

Connection Times

C:\Windows\inf\setupapi.dev.log

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Last updated 3 months ago